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ABSTRACT
In an online study conducted separately in the UK and
the US, participants rated the acceptability and fairness
of four interventions: two types of ﬁnancial incentives
(rewards and penalties) and two types of medical
interventions (pills and injections). These were stated to
be equally effective in improving outcomes in ﬁve
contexts: (a) weight loss and (b) smoking cessation
programmes, and adherence in treatment programmes
for (c) drug addiction, (d) serious mental illness and (e)
physiotherapy after surgery. Financial incentives (weekly
rewards and penalties) were judged less acceptable and
to be less fair than medical interventions (weekly pill or
injection) across all ﬁve contexts. Context moderated the
relative preference between rewards and penalties:
participants from both countries favoured rewards over
penalties in weight loss and treatment for serious mental
illness. Only among US participants was this relative
preference moderated by perceived responsibility of the
target group. Overall, participants supported funding
more strongly for interventions when they judged
members of the target group to be less responsible for
their condition, and vice versa. These results reveal
a striking similarity in negative attitudes towards the use
of ﬁnancial incentives, rewards as well as penalties, in
improving outcomes across a range of contexts, in the
UK and the USA. The basis for such negative attitudes
awaits further study.
INTRODUCTION
Financial incentives are increasingly being used to
improve outcomes by motivating health-related
behaviour change. These include incentive schemes
aimed at enhancing outcomes of existing treat-
ments such as drug abstinence programmes and
taking medication to prevent relapse of medical
conditions such as psychosis and stroke.
1e3 Incen-
tives are also being used to achieve sustained weight
loss and smoking cessation.
4e6 While the evidence
of effectiveness is limited and mixed in many
contexts, there is good evidence for their effective-
ness in drug abstinence programmes and to a lesser
extent, for smoking cessation in pregnancy.
17
All the schemes described above involve the use
of rewards. While negative incentives are implicit
in taxes on tobacco and alcohol and in higher
insurance premiums tied to behavioural risk factors
such as smoking, explicit negative incentives are less
often used than reward schemes and have been
evaluated less frequently. Negative incentive
schemes are currently mostly seen in the form of
self-binding contracts involving individuals pledging
their own money or betting with others on
success or failure to attain health-related targets,
8
although evidence on the effectiveness of such
contracts is absent.
Even if effective, offering ﬁnancial incentives to
motivate health-enhancing behaviour attracts
opprobrium in lay and professional media, being
criticised for unfairly rewarding bad behaviour and
being coercive.
9 10 We report here on a systematic
attempt to describe and understand the accept-
ability of different types of ﬁnancial incentives
across a range of health contexts. We set out to
compare the acceptability of ﬁnancial incentives
with similarly effective medical interventions, as
well as the use of penalties compared with rewards.
We presented ﬁnancial incentives as interventions
additional to existing programmes, rather than as
rewards for changing health behaviours per se. We
also explored the extent to which perceived
responsibility for needing healthcare moderates the
acceptability of rewards compared with penalties.
We conducted the study separately with partici-
pants from the UK and the US, the two high-
income countries where ﬁnancial incentive schemes
are most often being used. We had no hypotheses
about speciﬁc differences between these countries.
Given the stark differences between their health-
care systems, which also made it necessary to
slightly adapt the wording, we analysed the data
for each participant group separately.
We predicted that participants would show less
support for equally effective health-related inter-
ventions involving ﬁnancial incentives than medi-
cally-based interventions. We also predicted that
rewards would be favoured over penalties for some
recipient groups of healthcare, and penalties over
rewards for others. More speciﬁcally, we predicted
that penalties would be favoured over rewards
when recipients were deemed responsible for their
condition, and vice versa.
METHOD
The study used a within-subjects design: 2 (type of
intervention: ﬁnancial vs medical) 3 2 (valence of
intervention: positive vs negative) 3 5 (basic
treatment scenario: smoking cessation, mental
illness, drug addiction, weight loss, physical
therapy).
Participants
The study was conducted online using a UK subject
panel (http://participate-in-research.org.uk) and a US
subject panel (http://www.sas.upenn.edu/wbaron/
q.html). Country of residence was identiﬁed as
follows: the US panel is run by Jonathan Baron, who
has address data for the members of his panel and
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Global medical ethicswho sent out a notiﬁcation email for the study only to members
holding US addresses. Members of the UK Participate in Research
panel submit information about their country of residence when
they sign up on the website, and again, notiﬁcation email was sent
only to such members who had reported the UK as country of
residence.
The US panel has been established over about 10 years and
consists of 1200 participants who closely match the 2000 US
census in demographic characteristics with the exception of
being slightly better educated on average and with an over-
representation of women.
11 T h eU Kp a n e lo ft h es t u d yi s
newly established and, at the time of the study, consisted of
about 150 participants, about equal numbers of men and
women; further demographic data are not yet available.
Participants of both panels found them online, partly through
links from other websites. For the UK panel, participants
had also been actively recruited through online ads offering pay
of about £2.00e3.00 for participation in online academic
research.
We removed two UK participants from the data who had
completed the questionnaire extremely quickly and whose
answers indicated that they did not take it seriously.
The included UK participants comprised 45 women and 43
men, aged between 18 and 81 years (M¼48, SD¼14.31). They
were paid £3.00 for completion of the questionnaire.
US participants comprised 70 women and 30 men, aged
between 23 and 67 years (M¼44.43, SD¼11.00). They were paid
US$3.50 for completion of the questionnaire.
Procedure and materials
On the ﬁrst page, participants saw an introduction message. UK
participants read that they would see hypothetical scenarios
about medical treatments offered by the UK NHS along with
interventions the NHS was considering funding in addition to
these treatments. They were told to assume that the proposed
interventions all ‘cost the same amount of money, per person,
for the same increase in effectiveness of the basic treatment’.
Participants were ﬁrst told: ‘Imagine your country has a national
health insurance programme. This programme is funded
through taxes. It pays for many medical treatments for all
residents, but not all treatments are covered’. Subsequently, all
references to the NHS were replaced by ‘the national health
insurance’.
On the following pages, participants saw at the top of each
page a one-sentence summary of the existing treatment,
followed by a two-sentence description of the proposed add-on
intervention.
Basic (existing) treatments comprised: a smoking cessation
programme, outpatient services for patients with mental illness,
treatment to reduce misuse of heroin and cocaine, weight loss
treatment, physical therapy following knee replacement surgery.
Add-on interventions comprised: a pill, an injection, an
incentive scheme involving penalties and an incentive scheme
paying rewards.
Details of the materials used are provided in the online
appendix.
For each participant, the order of these 534¼20 treatment 3
intervention combinations was randomised and presented on
separate pages, each followed by the same questions assessing
acceptability and perceptions of fairness. Figure 1 gives an
example page. This was followed by three more pages with
a question about perceived pleasantness of the interventions,
perceived responsibility for the underlying medical problem and
questions about demographic characteristics.
Measures
Each of the 20 pages with a treatment 3 add-on intervention
combination was followed by a question about acceptability and
a question about perceptions of fairness:
Acceptability
Do you think this add-on intervention should be funded by the
NHS?
Deﬁnitely yesedeﬁnitely not (7-point scale, ranging from +3
to  3).
Fairness
How fair do you think it would be to implement this add-on
intervention?
Very fairevery unfair (7-point scale, ranging from +3 to  3).
Following the 20 treatment 3 intervention combinations, we
included a manipulation check for perceived pleasantness or
unpleasantness of the interventions.
Perceived pleasantness of the interventions
How pleasant or unpleasant do you think it is (eg, to be given an
injection every week)?
Very unpleasantevery pleasant (7-point scale, ranging from
 3 to +3).
On the next page, each participant rated the perceived
responsibility for the condition underlying the basic treatment.
Perceived responsibility
How responsible do you think (smokers) are for (smoking)?
They are entirely responsibleethey are not at all responsible
(7-point scale, ranging from +3 to  3).
On the last two pages, we asked participants about relevant
characteristics of their own health behaviour or medical history
(eg, whether they were or had been overweight), and about their
age and gender. Participants could choose ‘prefer not to answer’
for sensitive medical questions.
Analysis
Data were analysed using the statistical package R.
12 To test for
differences in acceptability between medical versus ﬁnancial
incentive interventions, we collapsed across interventions
involving pills and injections to form medical interventions,
collapsed across interventions involving rewards and penalties to
form ﬁnancial interventions, and then conducted t tests testing
for a difference between these groups, by collapsing answers
across basic treatments to the mean per subject and conducting
paired t tests of those means. To test for differences in relative
acceptability of rewards versus penalties between target groups,
Figure 1 Example page for treatment 3 intervention combinations and
questions.
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compared the relative preference for penalties versus rewards
across different target groups by conducting an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with basic treatment and type of incentive as
the independent factors, with acceptability as the dependent
variable, and tested for an interaction. To test for inﬂuence
of perceived responsibility, we conducted mixed models using
the R package lme4, specifying for each model crossed random
effects for subjects and basic treatment scenarios, an analysis
that takes account of differences between subjects and scenarios
by modelling them.
13 To test for the inﬂuence of perceived
responsibility on overall funding support, we entered perceived
responsibility into the model as a ﬁxed effect along type of
intervention. To test for the inﬂuence of perceived responsibility
on differential support of rewards versus penalties, we included
type of incentive (reward vs penalty), perceived responsibility
and their interaction as ﬁxed effects (the interaction would
show the effect). We report CIs for the ﬁxed effects based on
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling (n¼10000) from the
posterior distribution of the parameter estimates.
RESULTS
Participants’ experiences with the medical problems
In all, 22% of UK participants and 19% of US participants were
current smokers; 33% (UK) and 49% (US) currently overweight;
18% (both countries) had experience with mental health prob-
lems; 26% (UK) and 29% (US) reported having taken recrea-
tional drugs other than alcohol; 24% (UK) and 27% (US) had
had an operation requiring physical therapy. Participants’
personal experience with the underlying problems had no effect
on the results we report below.
Perceived pleasantness of the interventions
We had included a pill and an injection to mimic the hedonic
valence of rewards compared with penalties. As predicted,
a weekly injection was judged to be less pleasant (UK:
M¼ 1.23, SD¼1.33; US: M¼ 1.10, SD¼1.50) than a weekly
pill (UK: M¼0.69, SD¼1.49; t(87)¼ 11.07; p<0.001; US:
M¼0.72, SD¼1.44; t(99)¼ 10.41; p<0.001), and a penalty was
judged as less pleasant (UK: M¼ 1.82, SD¼1.31; US: M¼ 2.07,
SD¼1.43) than a reward (UK: M¼2.18, SD¼1.25; t(87)¼ 17.59;
p<0.001; US: M¼2.06, SD¼1.47; t(99)¼ 17.76; p<0.001). We
also predicted that ﬁnancial incentives would evoke a starker
hedonic judgement than medical interventions. For both panels,
the difference in hedonic valence was stronger for ﬁnancial
incentives than for medical treatments (UK: t(87)¼8.02;
p<0.001; US: t(99)¼9.7; p<0.001).
Perceived responsibility of those requiring treatment
As predicted, some target groups were perceived to be more
responsible for their conditions than were others, see table 1
Among UK and US participants, there was strong agreement
that smokers are responsible for smoking, that patients with
mental health issues are not responsible for their illness, and that
drug addicts are responsible for their addiction. Judgements
were less pronounced and less unanimous for patients who are
overweight and those requiring knee surgery.
Acceptability of ﬁnancial incentives
Financial incentive interventions were perceived as less accept-
able than medical interventions by UK and US participants
(ﬁgure 2).
For the UK participants, the mean answer, across subjects and
basic treatments, to the acceptability question was  0.05 (mean
SD for scenarios ¼2.30) for the ﬁnancial incentive interventions
and 1.31 (mean SD of scenarios ¼1.79) for the medical inter-
ventions. This difference is signiﬁcant (t(87)¼ 7.62, p<0.001;
95% CI of the mean of differences:  1.72 to  1.01).
For the US participants, the mean was  0.13 (mean SD for
scenarios¼2.32) for the ﬁnancial incentive interventions and
1.26 (mean SD for scenarios¼1.81) for the medical interventions,
this, too, a signiﬁcant difference (t(99)¼ 9.41, p<0.001; 95% CI
of the mean of differences:  1.68 to  1.09).
Perceived fairness of ﬁnancial incentives
Financial incentives were perceived by UK and US participants
as less fair than medical interventions.
For the UK participants, the mean answer to the question
about fairness was  0.05 (mean SD for scenarios ¼2.28) for
the ﬁnancial incentive interventions and 1.20 (mean SD for
scenarios ¼1.82) for the medical interventions, a signiﬁcant
difference (t(87)¼ 7.42, p<0.001; 95% CI of the mean of
differences:  1.58 to  0.91).
For the US participants, the mean answer to the question
about fairness was  0.23 (mean SD for scenarios ¼2.22) for the
ﬁnancial incentive interventions and 1.11 (mean SD for scenarios
¼1.78) for the medical interventions, also a signiﬁcant difference
(t(99)¼ 9.08, p<0.001; 95% CI of the mean of differences:
 1.64 to  1.05).
For UK and US panels, we calculated the correlation of each
participants’ answers to these two questions; the mean within-
participant correlation was 0.75 for UK participants (SD¼0.32)
and 0.82 for US participants (SD¼0.22): participants tend to
think that an intervention should be funded when they think
implementing it is fair, and vice versa.
Rewards versus penalties
Rewards were judged more acceptable than penalties in some
but not all contexts (ﬁgure 3). In a within-subject ANOVA
(dependent variable: funding support; independent variables:
type of intervention, basic treatment), the interaction between
type of intervention (rewards vs penalties) and basic treatment
was signiﬁcant. For the UK participants, F(4)¼4.07, p¼0.003; for
the US participants, F(4)¼4.81, p<0.001.
Participants from both countries favoured rewards over
penalties in the contexts of helping patients who are overweight
lose weight and of outpatient services for patients with mental
health issues. The predicted effect of perceived responsibility on
acceptability of rewards versus penalties was found only in US,
but not UK participants: in a mixed model, the interaction
between type of ﬁnancial incentive (rewards vs penalties) and
perceived responsibility is signiﬁcant for the US panel (b¼ 0.16,
SE¼0.05, t¼ 3.14, 95% CI ¼ 0.27 to  0.06), but not for the
UK panel (b¼ 0.07, SE¼0.05, t¼ 1.35, 95% CI ¼ 0.19 to 0.03).
Direct inﬂuence of perceived responsibility on acceptability
Figure 1 shows that across all intervention types (medical and
ﬁnancial), there was more support for funding of interventions
for some treatment groups than for others. For UK participants
but not those from the US, funding was more strongly
supported when the target group was not perceived responsible
for their condition. The ﬁxed effect of perceived responsibility
Table 1 Perceived responsibility (mean (SD)) for problem
Drug
addiction
Mental health
problems Overweight
Knee
replacement Smoking
UK (n¼88) 1.78 (1.45)  2.35 (1.02) 1.39 (1.37)  1.16 (1.93) 2.01 (1.45)
US (n¼100) 1.93 (1.29)  1.97 (1.22) 1.15 (1.22)  0.34 (1.72) 2.13 (1.26)
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CI¼ 0.27 to  0.13); for US participants it was  0.05 (SE¼0.02,
t¼ 2.51, 95% CI¼ 0.09 to 0).
DISCUSSION
Given equal effectiveness, ﬁnancial incentives, whether rewards
or penalties, are judged as less acceptable than medical inter-
ventions. We found this across ﬁve different health contexts and
in participants from the UK and US. There are two possible sets
of explanations for these ﬁndings. The ﬁrst set assumes that
these are valid results: participants based their judgements on
the stated assumption that the ﬁnancial and medical interven-
tions were equally effective, and perceive incentives as less
acceptable. This raises two questions: ﬁrst, what explains these
attitudes? Second, would incentives be seen as more acceptable
if they were more effective, or would people refuse to make such
trade offs? There are several possible reasons why people may
ﬁnd ﬁnancial incentives less acceptable. It may stem from
a violation of a cultural norm, namely the use of money in the
relationship between a doctor or healthcare provider and
a patient. Much has been written about areas of life in which
money is an acceptable form of exchange and those in which
it is not, these boundaries varying across time and between
cultures.
14e17 The perceived unacceptability of ﬁnancial
incentives in the current context may also stem from a marked
sense of injustice about offering money, a fungible good, to those
who, through their own behaviour, might have avoided this.
Concerning the nature of the incentive, it is possible that
incentives that are less exchangeable (eg, vouchers or vouchers
prespeciﬁed only for exchange of goods related to improved
health) may be more acceptable.
We found differential support for penalties over rewards
depending on the context of the basic treatments. We found only
limited evidence that this related to perceptions of responsibility.
It is plausible that our question about responsibility tapped
different constructs for the different medical conditions. For
example, notions of responsibility for being addicted to drugs are
plausibly tied more closely to moral judgement and attributions
of blame than are notions of responsibility for a knee injury.
Evidence exists that some health behaviours, such as cigarette
smoking, can become ‘moralised’,
18 19 potentially linking
responsibility with personal blameworthiness.
The second set of explanations for these ﬁndings is that they
are not valid that is, they do not represent people’s true views.
This may be because the manipulations did not work as
intended. For example, although we had instructed participants
to assume that all interventions were equally effective in
improving outcomes, it is possible that participants did not
Figure 2 Acceptability of funding
(means) of different interventions in ﬁve
contexts.
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penalties versus rewards for the
different target groups (identiﬁed by
basic treatment). Mean answers to the
question ‘Should this be funded?’ ( 3:
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effectiveness explaining differences in perceived acceptability.
Respondents may simply believe that different interventions
were differing in effectiveness, based on their own ‘prior
probabilities,’ even if told that this was not so.
Replication and extension of the current study is needed to
allow a more robust examination of the acceptability of ﬁnancial
incentives, using named as well as unnamed conditions, exper-
imentally varied to assess the extent to which the acceptability
of incentives is inﬂuenced by cost, effectiveness, perceived
responsibility as well as type of reward (cash or vouchers for
general or prespeciﬁed use).
Rejection of incentive schemes by the general public could all
too easily be seen by politicians as a reason not to introduce
them. This conclusion does not follow from our ﬁndings. To
answer the question as to whether or not incentive schemes
should be introduced would require more evidence on their
consequences, intended and unintended, as well as in-depth
analysis of the associated ethical issues of using incentives in
healthcare. Perceptions about the acceptability of incentives,
especially if accompanied by strong feelings, can be seen as
a consequence,
20 but the basis for such judgements are not
fully understood. It may be the case that the results reported
here stem from prejudice and illegitimate value judgements,
and should thus not be reﬂected in policy decisions. For
example, it is not clear how stable the preference for medical
over ﬁnancial interventions really is ‘taboos’ of using money in
some contexts vary across cultures and may well change over
time.
14 As noted above, rejection of incentives may be based on
beliefs about effectiveness or about unintended consequences,
beliefs that can be challenged by evidence. Acceptance of
different schemes may be subject to framing and presentation,
or to personal experience, all of which vary and can be inﬂu-
enced. Even if a residual disutility for incentives in health
contexts stubbornly persists, beneﬁts may be great enough to
justify overriding such concerns. At the other extreme, oppo-
sition to ‘rewarding bad behaviour’ might translate into the
very tangible consequence of corroding the goodwill, and
eroding the good behaviour, of those not rewarded for their
virtue.
We note that ‘acceptability’ is a rather problematic concept.
What we have not presented here is a survey of attitudes to
incentives, which would inherently be time and context bound,
sensitive to changes in salient background, such as exposure to
recent news reports of incentive schemes or direct participation
in such a scheme. Nevertheless, ‘acceptability’ is in some sense
a relational property linking the incentive, the health behaviour,
the respondent’s attitudes and beliefs, and the wider context.
And, as noted, acceptability is not inherently a normative
concept that can be mapped directly onto right and wrong, fair
or unfair. Nevertheless, the ﬁndings here presented do give some
clues as to how experimentally informed evaluations of the
fairness and moral rightness or wrongness of incentive schemes
could be developed further, and of how the supposedly timeless
intuitions of philosophers about these matters may be improved
by the use of experimental studies.
Strengths and limitations of the current study
The present study is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to examine the
acceptability of using ﬁnancial incentives, penalties and
rewards, across a range of health contexts. While surveys have
been conducted on the acceptability of using ﬁnancial incentives
in single contexts including compliance with drug treatment for
psychosis and using rewards for smoking cessation, obesity,
blood pressure control and diabetes management,
3 21 this is the
ﬁrst study to our knowledge to assess acceptability of rewards
and penalties across health contexts and in two countries. The
scenarios we used can be seen as less controversial than some
settings for incentives aimed at recipients of healthcare that are
currently used or considered, such as paying for testing, paying
for immunisation, or paying for adherence to a medication
regimen with possible side effects. Our main ﬁnding of low
acceptability of ﬁnancial incentives could reasonably be
expected to be even stronger for such scenarios. However, there
may be a qualitative difference in the opposition to paying
patients for compliance with a medical regimen than for
improving harmful health-related behaviour: rejection of the
former could be based on a feeling of undue inﬂuence
(‘coercion’) to accept side effects, however small, whereas
rejection of the latter could be based, especially where rewards
are involved, on a feeling that bad behaviour should not be
indirectly rewarded.
The study was limited in several ways. The scenarios were
necessarily different for US and UK participants. UK respon-
dents were asked to make judgements about resource allocation
in an existing national health system. To keep the question
comparable for the US panel, we asked about a hypothetical
‘national health insurance.’ US participants show less support to
fund any type of treatment than UK participants. This, and
some comments made by US participants, reﬂect an uneasy
stance towards national funding of medical treatments. By
contrast, the pattern of results relating to ﬁnancial versus
medical interventions, and those relating to rewards versus
penalties, are strikingly similar between the two countries. We
think this increases validity of our ﬁndings regarding accept-
ability of ﬁnancial incentives, because it suggests they apply
irrespective of such differences in health provision. We do not
know how representative our participants are of the UK and US
populations, respectively. Members of online panels are conve-
nience samples, but are likely to be more representative of the
population in general than other convenience samples
commonly used, such as university students.
Our question about fairness was by necessity brief. How
different aspects of fairness are perceived in this context is
a topic for further research.
Conclusions
This preliminary study suggests that even if effective, the use of
ﬁnancial incentives to motivate health-enhancing behaviours
may be seen to be less acceptable than similarly effective medical
interventions. Possible explanations for this ﬁnding await
replication and extension of the current study.
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